What is the Value of a Life?

My old economics professor used to work his way off on tangents that were often closer to Animal Planet than to the name of the book we all brought to class, but he’d always bring the class back with his oft-repeated conclusion: “Everything is Economics.” Now, whether or not that is completely the case is not something which is about to be argued here. It will simply suffice to say that he has a point. Modern economics, after all, was essentially the first discipline to recognize and prove that a non-actor has as much effect on the result of a system as one who chooses to act. Markets, and it follows all human social systems, are completely democratic: we all vote, whether we like it or not.

Take, for example, the produce section of your grocery store. While shopping there, you make many choices, both in filling and not filling your shopping cart. To narrow this example down, say you have a choice between a basket of apples and one of oranges. Personally, I prefer apples, so that is what I would put in my cart. But that choice goes beyond just my cart and just that particular grocery store. In the big picture, I am placing an increased value on apples two-fold: I am decreasing the supply by one apple, and am registering my demand for the same in a real and concrete way. This choice, however, wasn’t just about increasing the value of apples. In addition, by my not selecting an orange, the supply increases by one more person who can buy one, and the demand also decreases by one customer who doesn’t want an orange. It follows that my choice to buy an apple both increases the value of the apple and decreases the value of the orange. Granted, my personal tastes register as a very small fraction in the big picture; it takes a massive trend to affect the value a noticeable amount. But, by economic principles, we can see that the value is nonetheless affected by one person.

It is important to note that the value of an apple is affected by more than just supply and demand. There are certain qualities of an apple that matter. And apple that is a deep red color, crisp, fresh, and unbruised is closer to our ideal of an apple, and is therefore of greater value. One could even say that the ripe fruit straight off the tree is more “apple-y” than the one that has been lying beneath the tree for a few weeks.

Now consider the value of a human life. In this day and age, many argue that they ought to have a “personal choice” to not suffer, to “die with dignity,” to euthanize the sick. My purpose is not to argue whether they have, or even whether they ought to have that choice. My purpose, rather, is to point out that just like in the produce section of a grocery store, a “personal choice” isn’t really merely “personal” at all.

It is obvious that the value of a human life is not zero by the simple fact that we spend the time and effort supporting our own lives. Similarly, some would say that the value of life is irrelevant beyond that of our own selfish needs. Yet a firefighter who risks his life to save others is not viewed as committing a moral evil, as this philosophy would suggest.

Still others say that the value of a life is fixed, be it zero (which has already been dealt with), infinity, or some arbitrary but constant value. The same firefighter shows all to be absurd; by his actions, he is not only not committing an evil, but by saving many, he is committing a moral good. It follows that since many lives are greater than one, and since multiple infinities is still the same as the original value – infinity – that such an answer is not the value of life, for reasons similar to those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, we can say that in saving many lives, the fire fighter’s life is more valuable than before, so the value is not fixed at all.
An interesting question is whether, like the apple, the qualities of a human life affect its value. In other words, if we say that a ripe, red, delicious apple is more “apple-y” than one a little beaten up and past its prime, can we also say that a person with perfect vision and hearing, with unmatched intelligence and physical prowess, and good looks to boot, is more “human-y” than you or I? The very thought is absurd. The humanity of a person does not change, regardless of eyesight, talent, or even health. This means that the value of a person is inherent in mere person-hood, regardless of any external characteristics. It follows from this that the fire fighter, by saving many lives and thus increasing the value of his life, also by his actions necessarily increases the value of all lives at the same time.

As they say, what goes up must come down. If the value of life can increase, it can also decrease. We see this in those who do not respect the inherent value of a life. Some claim that “quality of life” is the thing, as though transitory environmental effects truly alter the value of life so significantly as to make it worthless. If we can toss out a barrel of rotten apples, can we not also toss someone who is severely ill or disabled, with little quality of life, as well? Here’s the rub: if something can be deemed worthless, it can also be deemed worth less. If a severely ill person has no value for continued survival, a marginally ill person has less value as well. The absurdity of this conclusion has already been shown. The “quality of life” is irrelevant with respect to a life’s continued worth.

True quality of life is in the choices we make and the actions we take to those ends, not in the morally irrelevant external qualities that would offset our value if we were, like apples, mere commodities to be bought and consumed. As the heroic fire fighter by his personal choices effects an increase in the value of all life, so too the euthanist effects a decrease in the value of all life by his, and his “patient’s” personal choices. As absurd as one can show their conclusions to be, their actions will still affect the value of human life, regardless. Our personal choices, both for good or for ill, have an effect on the overall value of life, regardless of what those choices may be, or for what relevant or irrelevant ends they would meet. If we hold that life is of great value, it is of greater value. If we hold that certain lives are less worth living, all life is less worth living.

What is the value of a life?

Precisely what we say it should be.